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Are currency crises caused by irresponsible macroeconomic policies? The answer used to be an unquali…ed yes: a currency crisis was a just retribution for government mismanagement. However, the recent crisis in Asia has led many observers to question this view. Most of the a-icted economies had budget surpluses and healthy foreign exchange reserves. While current account de…cits were large in some countries (Thailand and Malaysia), they were very modest in others (Korea and Indonesia). Thus it is di¢cult to argue that currency depreciations were needed because of macroeconomic reasons.
This paper contributes to the growing literature that places the corporate sector and its policies as the central issue in currency crises. In this paper we argue that the way exporting companies …nance their investments and the pro…tability of those investments is the major factor in determining the severity of a currency crisis. The underlying reason is that governments have an incentive to rescue highly leveraged exporting companies through a currency depreciation when the companies' future operations are in danger.
A currency depreciation is a way to increase the exporting companies cash ‡ows measured in domestic currency, and thus …nancial distress and its costs can be avoided. However, if exporting companies correctly anticipate this bailing out policy, we should observe increasing borrowing and declining pro…tability in exporting industries prior to a currency crisis.
In order to examine the role of corporations and their policies in currency crises, this paper considers micro level data of those countries that have su¤ered a currency crisis in the last ten years. We compile a database that contains data on …rms in 18 countries. We analyze the …rms' …nancial policies, pro…tability ratios and exposure to exchange rate movements. The …rst hypothesis we test is that prior to a currency crises, companies' debt-equity ratios increase. Moreover, we argue that the …rms that bene…t from a currency depreciation are the ones that tend to increase their borrowing. In order to …nd out which …rms bene…t from currency depreciations, we sort companies into two groups using individual companies' stock market returns. In the …rst group we have companies whose stock returns decrease when the domestic currency appreciates with respect to the U.S. dollar (negative exposure companies) and in the second group those companies whose stock returns increase (positive exposure companies). After sorting the companies into these two groups, we show that those companies with negative exposure increase their debt-equity ratios prior to a currency depreciation. In addition, we analyze companies pro…tability and liquidity using several standard ratios, and show that pro…tability for the negative exposure companies decreases signi…cantly before a currency crisis. We also show, in a multivariate regression framework controlling for …rm characteristics, that companies that bene…t from a currency depreciation have higher leverage than companies that are harmed by the depreciation.
We also examine how …rms' leverage a¤ects the amount of currency depreciations. We …nd that it is especially the leverage of negative exposure companies that a¤ects the magnitude of currency depreciations.
Finally, we argue that countries with the weakest corporate governance mechanisms are more prone for this phenomenon of excessive leverage leading to a currency depreciation because of forced reliance on debt in …nancing investments. We operationalize this by using the variables developed by La Porta et. al. in addition to leverage ratios to explain the magnitude of currency depreciations.
The results of this paper provide support for most of the implications derived in Bris and Koskinen (2000) , who argue that it is ex-post optimal for a government to bail out …nancially distressed exporting …rms by means of a currency depreciation. Aghion et al. (2000) and Krugman (1999) also argue that …rms' …nancial distress is the important factor causing currency crises. Shocks (or loss of con…dence) cause depreciations which then cause …nancial distress problems for corporations and further depreciations. The hypothesis underlying such argument is that currency depreciations decrease …rms' pro…tability. Thus, if the papers of Aghion et al. (2000) and Krugman (1999) were to hold empirically, we should observe that positive exposure …rms' high leverage leads to increased amount of depreciation. This implication is not supported by our data. In addition to these …nancial distress models, Johnson et al. (2000) emphasize problems in corporate governance as an explanation to the Asian crisis and show that lack of outside investor protection is related to the amount of depreciation in emerging markets. We obtain results, consistent with Johnson et al. (2000) , and we are able to provide an alternative explanation for these …ndings: poor corporate governance mechanisms lead to forced debt …nancing and thus, through high leverage, ultimately to currency depreciations 1 .
The next section of the paper describes the data and its sources. In Section II we analyze the stock price reaction of the companies in our sample to a currency depreciation, based on our measures of exchange rate exposure. In Section III we study the relationship between leverage and exchange rates. In Section IV we relate exchange rate exposure to several di¤erent measures of pro…tability. In Section V we provide cross-sectional evidence on the determinants of a company's capital structure and on the amount of a 1 There are several other papers that depart from the traditional macroeconomic reasoning in explaining currency crises. Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1998a argue that creditors' capital was at least implicitly guaranteed in some Asian countries, if …nancial di¢culties were to arise. This would naturally lead to overinvestment in risky projects at the expense of safer ones. Velasco (1998a, 1998b ) model a currency crisis in a same way as Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model a bank run. With foreign borrowing and a …xed exchange rate, a run on banks becomes a run on the currency.
In Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999) out ‡ow of capital can lead to domestic …re sales, because a country has a lack of international collateral, thus deepening a capital account crisis to a full …nancial crisis. Allen and Gale (2000) argue that currency crises can serve as a risk sharing mechanism between domestic bank depositors and international bond markets currency depreciation. Section VI concludes the paper.
I Data

A Sample description
Throughout the paper, a crisis is de…ned as the event in which a government decides to let its previously …xed currency ‡oat or administratively devalues it. We only consider currencies that can ‡oat within a band or that are …xed. Bands can be either nominal or real, so crawling peg currencies are also considered …xed for our purposes.
We obtain information about currency crises that have occurred in the period 1985-2000. These are partly compiled in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) . Additionally, Italy, the United Kingdom and the countries that experienced the Asian crises of 1997 are also included in the sample. When a country has su¤ered several crises in the period 1985-2000 (this is the case, for instance, for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Spain, and Turkey), exclusively the last one is considered. The …nal sample of crises includes eighteen countries, and its description is in Table I . There have been other ma jor currency depreciations not included in the …nal sample for a variety of reasons. For example, we do not include the Russian crisis in 1998 because of a lack of data on Russian …rms. We also eliminate Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Israel, Peru, and Uruguay, because we lack stock price data before the crises. For some countries the most recent crisis has not been considered due to the unavailability of data after the crisis 2 . Brazil, for instance, su¤ered its last crisis in 1999. Finally, some Asian countries, like Japan, that experienced considerable depreciations did not have a system of …xed rates prior to the crises.
For each country in the sample, Datastream provides a Global Market Index, that includes a varying number of …rms per country 3 . Datastream also provides accounting information regarding all the available …rms in the corresponding market, for a window of …ve years around the year of the currency crisis.
We are able to …nd information in Datastream for 4,245 …rms from the eighteen countries we consider. 2 We require six years of past information, and two years of post-crisis data, on stock prices for the …rms available in the sample in order to perform the estimation. We compare the number of …rms in our sample with the total number of …rms in the corresponding exchange as of December of the corresponding crisis year, from the International Federation of Stock Exchanges .
On average, our sample contains 53.88 percent of all the …rms listed in a country's main stock exchange.
This percentage is lower for Latin American countries, where currency depreciations happened earlier and hence the lack of data problem is more severe.
[Insert Table IA] In Table IA we have calculated the domestic stock market return at the time of the currency depreciation, as well as in the …ve months that surround the crisis. On average stock prices decline by 0.68% in the month following the depreciation month. We also calculate the currency depreciation relative to the US dollar (throughout the paper, exchange rates are calculated as units of dollars per domestic currency). At the same time, the average currency depreciation in our sample amounts to 30.01 percent in the 5 months that surround the crises. The largest depreciation happened in Argentina (142.48 percent), the lowest in Venezuela (3.56 percent appreciation in …ve months). The average debt-to-equity ratio (book values) for the total sample is 104.88 percent, with South Korea having the highest ratio (302.98 percent), and Brazil the lowest (33.60 percent). By regions, Asian countries display the highest debt levels, with an average of 147.59 percent. European countries had a 79.60 percent debt ratio and the average for Latin America is 48.36 percent.
Table IB describes the exchange rate regimes for the countries in our sample. Strictly speaking, only Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and the Philippines had …xed exchange rates prior to their currency devaluations.
In addition to the countries in the ERM, Finland, Norway and Sweden maintained the exchange rate within a band with respect to the ECU. Other countries (South Korea, Indonesia, Singapore, and Taiwan) …xed their real exchange rates with respect to either the dollar or a basket of currencies. Malaysia and Venezuela allowed for ‡uctuations with respect to the dollar. Figure 1 shows that, although pegged to the dollar, Latin American currencies were the ones that ‡uctuated the most before the crises. Brazil pegged the real only six months before its last devaluation, and Argentina and Mexico su¤ered several crises before the ones we consider in this paper. Asian exchange rates are not excessively volatile in the last six years before the crises (the standard deviation of the monthly change in exchange rates is 0.84 percent in Asia, 1.54 percent in Europe, and 5.52 in Latin America). 4 Pomerleano, with a sample of …rms that include Japan and Hong Kong, employs data from 734 companies.
[Insert Table IA] [Insert Figure 1] In the next section we survey the literature on exchange rate exposure and propose a new methodology that allows us to di¤erentiate …rms depending on whether they bene…t from or are harmed by currency depreciations. We regress the stock return of every …rm on exchange rate changes and the component of the domestic market return that is orthogonal to the changes in the exchange rate. Controlling for the domestic market return allows us to solve the more puzzling feature of early exposure studies: the fact that most …rms appeared to have a positive exposure to exchange rate changes.
II Exchange rate exposure .1 Literature Review
For the past twenty years, …nancial researchers have paid a great deal of attention to how to measure a …rm's exposure to exchange rate movements. The basic models can be grouped into two categories: accounting -based exposure and stock price -based exposure. The studies by Claessens et al. (1998) and Allayannis (1996) belong to the …rst group. They respectively use the percentage of exports on sales, and the ratio of net exports to sales as a measure of a …rm's exposure to currency risk. In our framework, however, we encounter three problems with this methodology: …rst, as Allayannis et al. (2000) show, exporting …rms were the ones that hedged the most prior to the Asian crises of 1997. This means that the percentage of exports is not a good measure of exchange rate exposure for Asian countries. The second problem is lack of data. The number of …rms for which data on exports is available is reduced in emerging markets 5 . Finally, it is possible that a …rm that only operates in the domestic market is nonetheless exposed to exchange rate risk, if competitors are foreign …rms that sell to the country where the domestic …rm operates 6 . Therefore, movements in the exchange rate a¤ect the competitiveness of the domestic …rm and therefore its pro…ts.
Among the studies that focus on stock price -based exposure, Jorion (1990 Jorion ( , 1991 , Bodnar and Gentry (1993) , and Amihud (1994) regress a company's stock return on exchange rate changes and additional 5 In their paper on the Asian crises of 1997, Allayannis et al. (2000) are able to …nd data on exports only for the largest 50 companies in each country. 6 For example, shipbuilders in China argued for a devaluation of the renminbi in 1998, since Japanese and South Korean shipbuilders became more competitive as a result of the 1997 crises (Financial Times, July 6, 1998).
control variables such as a market portfolio return 7 . Jorion (1991) uses a two-factor model, with the value-weighted stock market return as the …rst factor and the orthogonal component of innovations in a trade-weighted exchange rate as the second factor. The orthogonalization eliminates spurious pricing of the exchange rate factor because of a possible correlation between exchange rate and market return. That is:
where R i;t is the realized return for security i from day t -1 to day t; R m;t is the realized equally weighted market return, from day t -1 to day t; and
is the residual of the regression of the exchange rate movement, R st , against the rate of return on the stock market. The component of exchange rate risk orthogonal to the market is priced if the coe¢cient ± s is nonzero.
Finally, Bodnar and Wong (2000) suggest that the inclusion of a market portfolio increases the precision of the residual exposure estimates. However, if the market portfolio has a non-zero exposure, including a market portfolio as a regressor shifts the distribution of the residual exposure estimates with respect to the total exposure counterparts. Therefore residual exposure estimates re ‡ect the deviation of the …rm's exposure from the market's portfolio exposure. As most studies use a value-weighted portfolio, dominated by large …rms with a more negative exposure to exchange rate movements, the residual exposure estimates su¤er from a positive shift. The solution the authors suggest is the use of an equal-weight market portfolio to correct for the correlation between …rm size and the sign of the exchange rate exposure.
.2 An alternative approach
We measure the exchange rate exposure by partly following the methodology in Jorion (1991). However, our procedure is exactly the opposite of Jorion's: in explaining individual companies' stock returns, we use as regressors the change in exchange rate and the component of market return that is orthogonal to the change in exchange rate. By using this methodology, we are able to circumvent the critique made by 7 In the early studies of Dumas (1978) , Adler and Dumas (1984) and Hodder (1982) , exposure was measured by the regression coe¢cient of the real value of the …rm on the exchange rate. Although these models are easy to implement, they …nd the percentage of …rms with a signi…cant exposure to exchange rate movements to be low. Bodnar and Wong (2000) . Hence we are able to estimate which companies have a negative and positive exchange rate exposure in absolute sense, and hence do not have to rely on estimates of currency exposure that are calculated relative to the market as a whole.
First we estimate the following regression for each country in our sample:
where R j mt is the market return, and R j xt is the change in the exchange rate in country j. We estimate the°coe¢cients using monthly data from month t = ¡72 to month t = ¡37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we calculate F 
where R ij is the stock return of …rm i in country j , R j x is the monthly change in the exchange rate in country j, and F j m is the estimated orthogonal component for market j. The estimated¯x i are, as stated, measures of …rm i's exposure to exchange rate risk. Additionally, to avoid non-synchronous movements in exchange rates and stock returns, we use monthly data.
In Table II we show for each country the average exchange rate beta and the orthogonal market beta, as well as the each individual market exposure coe¢cient to exchange rate movements, following the methodology outlined above. The average exchange rate beta is the size-weighted average of the exchange rate betas calculated for the …rms in a particular country. The market exposure is, for every country, the estimate of°in the regression (3). Eleven countries in our sample have a negative exchange rate exposure.
All European countries, except Turkey, have a negative value for°1, whereas in all Asian countries, except for the Philippines and Thailand,°1 is positive. In Thailand, for instance, the country exposure is ¡7:042
. Indonesia, in the other extreme, displays a country exposure of 4.607.
[Insert Table II] We expect exporting …rms to display a negative exchange rate beta, while domestic …rms should have a positive exposure. Seoul Foods, for instance, a South Korean …rm that manufactures bread and snack foods (arguably a non-exporting …rm) has a beta of 2:509. An exporting …rm such as Shin Corporation (2000), since we …nd markets to be exposed to currency movements. Therefore, and in the absence of data on the structure of the balance sheet for each …rm, we are able to characterize every …rm in the sample into two categories depending on its exposure to exchange rate movements: …rms that bene…t from currency depreciations, and …rms that su¤er from depreciations. It is worth noting, that exporting …rms may have an insigni…cant exchange rate beta if they hedge their currency exposure. However, this is consistent with the argument in this paper: so exporting …rms that hedge their currency exposure shouldn't have an incentive to increase their leverage prior to a currency crisis.
We rank …rms in a particular country by their exchange rate beta. Firms are not comparable in terms of exchange rate exposure across countries. Therefore we rank each …rm with respect to the other companies in the same country by splitting the sample between …rms with negative and positive exchange rate beta.
In the next sections, we analyze the stock price reaction to a currency crisis, and the di¤erent e¤ects of the currency depreciation on …rms depending on whether the …rm has negative or positive exposure to currency movements.
III Stock price e¤ects
A good test of the outlined methodology is to analyze stock price e¤ects around the currency depreciation for …rms with positive and negative exchange rate beta. One expects …rms with negative exchange rate beta to react positively to the currency crisis, since their revenues increase (either because they are exporting …rms, or because their competitors have an opposite exposure to the exchange rate).
We follow the standard procedure of estimating
; where b ® i and b m i are the estimates in the regression R ijt = ® i +¯m i R m j t + ² ijt . The estimation is performed for a window running from t = ¡72 to t = ¡36 months relative to the depreciation month for each country. Results are reported in Table III , where we display cumulative abnormal returns for di¤erent subperiods around the crises. For the overall sample (4; 750 …rms), the announcement return (two months around the date of the currency depreciation) is -4.98, signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the one percent level. In Table IA , we report a 0.68 percent negative market return at t = 0. Across regions, the CAR at from t = ¡1 to t = +1 is ¡3:66 percent in European countries, -5.30 percent for the Asian economies, and -4.97 percent for Latin America; markets are in the U.S.A., Europe, Australia, Japan, Central & South America. with the three coe¢cients signi…cant at the 1 percent level 9 . Harvey and Roper (1999) show that in Asian markets there is a consistent pattern of stock price declines prior to the devaluation. However, they focus on raw returns rather than CARs.
[Insert Table III] Interestingly, we …nd a distinctive pattern of returns for negative and positive exchange rate beta …rms in Asia in the period following the currency depreciation. Negative beta …rms display a positive CAR of 28.44 percent, and 10.61 percent for the group of positive exchange rate beta …rms (only the former signi…cant at the one percent level). The same pattern is found in Europe and Latin America: negative exchange rate beta …rms su¤er less from the currency depreciation.
IV Firm leverage and exchange rate exposure
In this section we empirically test the hypothesis that …rms with negative exposure to currency movements display increases in leverage prior to currency depreciations. The rationale for such an argument is that …rms that bene…t from a currency depreciation have an incentive to increase their leverage, because if the risks of high leverage materialize, the …rms expect a currency depreciation as a form of a bailout (see Bris and Koskinen, 2000) .
We focus on a sample of countries that have su¤ered currency crises since 1985 and analyze the …nancial policies of …rms in those countries depending on their currency exposure. The testable hypothesis outlined above implies that, prior to a currency depreciation, we should observe an increase in corporate borrowing, and a decline in pro…tability.
We obtain data from Datastream on each …rm's debt-to-equity ratio 10 (book value of total debt divided by book value of shareholders equity). The debt-to-equity ratio is analyzed in the last three years preceding the currency devaluation, as well as two years after the devaluation. We gather data on a …rm's total debtto-equity ratio, as well as on the percentage of short-term debt to total debt. 9 Additionally, the sample of European …rms include a majority of …rms with negative exposure to exchange rates. Bartov and Wong (2000) show that if the market portfolio has a non-zero exposure to exchange rate movements, the distribution of returns shift with respect to the total market exposure. Therefore, we expect negative CARs for European …rms. 10 Throughout the paper, we consider the debt-to-equity ratio as the object of study. The results do not change qualitatively when we use the debt-to-value ratio instead.
[Insert Table IV] The Results are in Tables IV and V. In Table IV we analyze changes in leverage prior to the crises.
We …nd that …rms that bene…t from a currency depreciation (those with negative exchange rate beta) increase their debt-to-equity ratios 9 percent in median (signi…cant at the one percent level) over a period of three years, while …rms that su¤er from a depreciation increase leverage by 6 percent (signi…cant at the one percent level). The result is uniform across regions, with respective increases of 12, 6, and 13 percent (signi…cant at the one percent level), for negative ERB …rms in Europe, Asia, and Latin America.
Positive ERB …rms show signi…cant changes in leverage in Europe and Asia (an increase of 8 and 4 percent, respectively). High exchange rate beta …rms in Mexico, for instance, increase their leverage ratios by 25 percent (one percent level signi…cant) in the three years preceding the currency crises 11 .
While this pattern could be due to factors other than currency weakness, we also show that the increase in leverage for …rms negatively exposed to exchange rate movements disappears after the currency depreciation. Except for Latin America, where the debt-to-equity ratio for negative ERB …rms increases a signi…cant 12.5 percent, we …nd that …rms that bene…t from the currency depreciation do not change their debt levels in the two years that follow the crises. However, …rms with positive ERB increase their leverage by a signi…cant one percent.
[Insert Table V] We also analyze the changes in short-term debt ratios. Results are in Table V . For the overall sample, the median short-term debt to total debt ratio does not change signi…cantly around the currency depreciation.
Asian countries were mostly …nanced with short term debt prior to the crises. We …nd short-term debt ratios of 62.63 and 54.8 in Europe and Latin America respectively.
Our results are consistent with Pomerleano (1998), Harvey and Roper (1999) , and Claessens et al.
(1998). Pomerleano (1998) documents the rapidly increasing debt ratios in Asia, specially short-term, from 1992 to 1996. However, he does not provide a disaggregated analysis by …rm characteristics. Harvey and Roper (1999) report that the median leverage ratio across the 261 …rms in their sample was 68.6 percent in 1992, and 114 percent in 1996. The leverage increase was mostly short-term again. In Claessens et al. (1998), Asian …rms also display increasing debt ratios, and their data suggest that the ratio of short term debt to total debt in the Asian economies was signi…cantly larger than in the US or Germany (the 11 A dissagregation by country is not shown in this paper, but can be obtained from the authors upon request. median short-term debt share increases from 47.26 percent in 1988 to 60.43 percent in 1996; this ratio is 25.9 percent in 1996 in the US, 45.3 percent in Germany).
In general, these results con…rm that …xed exchange rate economies display increasing corporate leverage prior to a currency depreciation, particularly among companies that bene…t from currency depreciations.
To what extent the excess leverage induces currency crises will be the objective of Section V. In the next section we analyze alternative measures of performance, pro…tability and investment. Return on Capital Employed in Pomerleano, 1998). We want to examine whether this result extends to other regions and whether it is uniform across …rms with di¤erent characteristics.
V Other Variables
[Insert Table VI] We obtain data on two measures of pro…tability (Earnings Before Interest and Taxes over Total Revenues, and Return on Capital Employed). Results are in Tables VI and VI I. We do …nd signi…cant declines in pro…tability under both measures and in the three regions under consideration. For the overall sample, the EBIT to revenues ratio decreases by 15.7 percent. This decline is more severe for negative ERB (-19.35 against -12.32 for positive ERB …rms). The other measure of pro…tability we use, the return on capital employed, leads to the same conclusion. The ROCE decreases by 31.3 percent for the overall sample, 39.3 for negative ERB …rms and 24.9 for positive ERB …rms. Although this pattern holds for the three regions, the decline in pro…tability is, for both types of …rms, larger in Asia than in Europe and Latin America.
Asian …rms decrease their EBIT and ROCE ratios by 26.23 and 60.75 respectively. This decline is 9.51 and 14.8 for Europe, and 9.54 and 50.8 for Latin America.
[Insert Table VII] B Financial Fragility Radelet and Sachs (1998) blame …nancial panic as a cause of the East Asia crises of 1997. They identify the ratio of short-term debt to foreign exchange reserves as an indicator of a country's risk. Having short-term debt in excess of foreign exchange reserves could have triggered a crisis in the same way as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) the inability of banks to face their short-term payments creates a bank run. Radelet and Sachs (1998) report that this ratio was above one for Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea prior to 1997. However, it was also below one for some other countries a¤ected by the crises, such as Taiwan and the Philippines.
We study …nancial fragility in a similar fashion to Radelet and Sachs (1998) , except that we use …rm level data. In our analysis, the current ratio measures the ability of a creditor to pay o¤ its short-term debts. The current ratio is calculated as current assets to current liabilities, and it re ‡ects the current liquidity of the …rm. Pomerleano (1998) argues that this would be a good measure of a …rm's …nancial fragility, although the ratio is not reported in his study.
[Insert Table VIII] We report in Table VIII the current ratio for 2; 671 …rms in our sample. For the overall sample, the ratio falls from 1.38 to 1.32 in the three years preceding the corresponding crises (an insigni…cant 4.55 percent in median), consistent with the country level results in Radelet and Sachs (1998) . The evolution of the current ratio di¤ers across …rms. While negative ERB …rms decrease their current ratio by 5.21 percent (signi…cant at the 5 percent level), the change for positive ERB …rms is insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero.
For the US, the current ratio for the total sample of Compustat …rms ( 5; 108 …rms with data available) in the years 1995 through 1998 is respectively 3.29, 3.70, 4.04, and 3.34. It compares to an average ratio of 1.32 for our total sample of 2; 671 …rms at the onset of their respective crisis. So we can conclude that …rms in countries that su¤ered currency crises showed early warnings of distress. It is also signi…cant that after the crises, positive exchange rate beta …rms' fragility increases even further (-3.62 percent for the overall sample, signi…cant at the 0.01 level), whereas the coe¢cient for negative exchange rate beta …rms is insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero, two years after the currency crises.
[Insert Table IX] Table IX complements the previous result. We display the interest coverage ratios for the …rms in the sample, and …nd a clear deterioration of the solvency of the exporting sector prior to the onset of the corresponding crises. For the overall sample, the interest coverage ratio decreases by 55.12 percent in the three years preceding the currency depreciation. Negative exchange rate beta …rms experience a decrease of 65.87 percent in their interest coverage ratio, while …rms with a positive exchange rate beta decrease their interest coverage ratio by 48.72; both coe¢cients are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 1 percent level.
The di¤erence in the path followed by the interest coverage ratio between positive and negative exchange rate beta …rms in Asia is especially signi…cant. Although for the three regions, the interest coverage ratio decreases prior to currency crises, regardless of the sign of the exposure to exchange rate movements, the decrease is signi…cantly larger for Asian …rms.
It is also interesting to note that for the overall sample, the interest coverage ratio increases during the two years following the currency crises. This result holds for both types of …rms. At the regional level, we observe important di¤erences. While for Asian …rms the interest coverage ratio improves in the two years that follow the crises for both types of …rms, in Latin America the increase in the interest coverage ratio is driven by the performance of positive ERB …rms, whereas in Europe the change for the whole region is insigni…cantly di¤erent from zero. Analysis of the interest coverage ratio reveals thus the special characteristics of the Asian crises with respect to the turbulences in Europe and Latin America.
C Investments
The pattern of decline in pro…tability described in previous subsections may be either due to a lack of investment projects in countries facing currency crises, or else to the corporate sector's tendency to choose risky projects. In the latter case, the failure of such projects may lead the economy into a recession if the incentives to choose risky projects are strong enough.
Whenever the exchange rate is …xed (or pegged to another one), Bris and Koskinen (2000) show that …rms that bene…t from a currency depreciation have an incentive to choose risky projects at the expense of safer ones, and will …nance them with debt, since the government will bail the …rms out if the risky projects fail and continuation is not possible because of debt overhang problems..
We analyze the investment policies in our sample of …rms from three di¤erent regions by obtaining data on net investments and analyzing how it changes around the currency crises. Net investments include capital expenditures and increases in working capital requirements, and incorporate total …rm investments, that is, short-term investment (necessary to operate the …rm on a daily basis), as well as long-term investments (mainly investments in …xed assets). Net investments gives a good indication on how much a company commits to continuation investments, since it does not include depreciation and amortization. However, normalizing the variable by either total revenues or total assets raises di¢culties at interpreting the results.
Since the values of this variables are denominated in the domestic currency, comparisons across countries are meaningless. Therefore in Table X we study percentage changes in Net Investments for a period of …ve years.
[Insert Table X] Overall, companies invest a 22.58 percent more before the onset of a currency crisis. There are not signi…cant di¤erences between positive and negative exchange rate beta …rms. Firms in Asian countries display signi…cant increases in investment rates (49.09 percent over the three years that precede the crises).
Together with Tables VI and VII, it seems that currency crises follow periods of low pro…tability and growing investment. Claessens et al. (1998) report, in line with our results, relatively higher investment rates (measured as new dollar investments as a share of existing …xed assets) in Asian …rms than in U.S. and German …rms. It is interesting to focus on the di¤erent investment policies followed by companies before and after currency depreciations. In our sample, we observe a dramatic change in investments following the crises: investments in Asia and Latin America grow signi…cantly less (in Asia there is even a slight decrease in investments following the depreciation), while the currency crises help European companies to foster their investment policies.
D Summary of the …ndings
Our analysis suggests that …rms in countries that have su¤ered dramatic exchange rate depreciations in the last decade, follow a similar pattern of investment and …nancial policies. We have documented a signi…cant decline in pro…tability in the corporate sector, that it is more accentuated for those …rms with negative exposure to exchange rate movements. Investment rates in the countries under consideration signi…cantly increase over the years that precede the currency crises. This results suggests that corporations must rely on external …nancing to engage in new investments. As shown in Tables IV and V debt, either long-or short-term, is the more likely source of …nancing. Whether debt …nancing arises as an optimal instrument because of the underdevelopment of equity markets, or because …rms …nd it optimal to lever up when exchange rates are …xed and devaluations are possible, will be studied in the next sections.
We document an increasing …nancial fragility (measured by the ratio of current assets to current liabilities). Other studies have shown the same pattern (Pomerleano (1998), Harvey and Roper (1999) ).
Tables IX additionally shows a signi…cant decline in the coverage ratios in countries su¤ering currency depreciations.
In the next section we analyze …rst whether micro variables (the …rm's exposure to exchange rates being the most important one) a¤ect the extent of a country's currency depreciation. Then we study cross-sectionally the determinants of a …rm decision to rely on debt …nancing when exchange rates are …xed and depreciations are possible.
VI Cross-sectional analysis A Firm leverage and currency depreciations
The argument made in this paper is that small, exporting countries where the pro…tability of the corporate sector's investments display declining pro…tability, are more likely to su¤er currency crises when the exchange rate is …xed and the government cannot commit ex-ante not to let the currency depreciate.
Firms in these …rms tend to rely heavily on debt …nancing, since through currency depreciation the costs of …nancial distress are passed on to the economy as a whole.
We therefore test directly the previous hypothesis by focusing on the eighteen countries that su¤ered a currency crises included in our sample. The endogenous variable in our regressions is the exchange rate change in the two months that surround the currency crisis. The magnitude of this variable is obviously negative for the countries in our sample, and lower the more severe the crisis was. Johnson et al. (2000) measure the severity of the Asian crises with the nominal exchange rate depreciation from the end of 1996 to January 1999. The countries in our sample have relatively …xed exchange rates over the sample period, so a better measure of the crises is the currency depreciation once the government support of the currency is abandoned. Secondly, using the debt-to-equity ratio as an explanatory variable of the currency depreciation over a long horizon creates causality problems, that we avoid by measuring the currency depreciation in a di¤erent subperiod. Finally, the amount of depreciation at t = 0 is not a good measure of the total depreciation; South Korea, for instance, let the currency ‡oat three months after the …rst speculative attacks against the won started (after repeated interventions by the Central Bank of Korea, South Korea abandoned its defense of the battered won on November 17, 1997). Additionally, most currencies depreciated dramatically in the months following the crisis 12 . We show the values of this variable in Table I . On average, depreciation amounts to 30.01 percent in a period of …ve months.
The results in the previous sections show that countries that su¤ered currency crises display signi…cant increases in corporate debt-to-equity ratios. We intend to analyze whether the corporate sector contributed to the severity of the crisis with high levels of leverage. We di¤erentiate between …rms with negative and 12 The Indonesian central bank widened the rupiah trading band from 12 percent to 8 percent in July 1997. The band was …nally abandoned in August 14, and in the next two months the rupiah lost 25:35 percent with respect to the dollar. positive exchange rate sensitivity by calculating the weighted average debt to equity ratio for …rms in either group. That is, for every country we calculate:
and similarly:
where¯i x denotes a …rm's exchange rate beta, and w i is the company's average sales in the three years that precede the corresponding currency crisis. Note that, within a country, the weighted average debt-to-equity ratio can be written as:
that is, we decompose the average leverage into two components: one attributable to …rms with negative ERB, and the other corresponding to …rms with positive ERB.
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that laws a¤ecting investor protection have consequences for corporate …nance. We therefore control in our analysis for di¤erences in e¢ciency of the judicial system, rule of law, corruption, and risk of expropriation across countries. Those variables are averages calculated over di¤erent time horizons, so their interpretation must be taken with caution. For instance, the e¢ciency of the judiciary system is calculated by La Porta et al. as the average between 1980 and 1983, while the currency crises we consider date from 1992. In our regressions, we employ the complete time series of data that they use in their paper 13 , and calculate the …ve year average prior to the corresponding currency crisis for our sample, and 7.67, 6.85, 6.9, and 8.05, for a total sample of 49 countries). Johnson et al. (2000) …nd that these four measures of legal institutions predict the changes in exchange rates in emerging markets better than the standard macro measures. They report a negative relationship between these variables 13 We are grateful to Florencio López de Silanes for providing us with these unpublished data. and the currency depreciation from 1997 to 1998 (low values for 'Corruption', and 'Risk of Expropriation' mean respectively high levels of corruption and expropriation risk). We control as well for the country's GDP. In terms of GDP, the recent currency crises have a¤ected to relatively small European countries, and large Asian and Latin American Economies.
[Insert Table XI] We provide di¤erent speci…cations due to the reduced number of degrees freedom. In Panel I we only make use of capital structure and corporate governance variables. The results in Models I and II provide empirical support to our claim that the relevant factor in explaining the severity of a currency crisis is not the average debt to equity ratio, but the debt to equity ratio for …rms with negative exposure to exchange rate changes. Even when we control for the variables in La Porta et al. (1998) , the average debt to equity ratio lacks explanatory power (Models III and V), whereas this parameter is signi…cant for negative ERB …rms (Models IV and VI).
In Panel I I, we add macroeconomic variables to our analysis. We observe that the average debt to equity ratio lacks explanatory power (Models XI and XII); whereas the coe¢cient for the negative ERB debt to equity ratio is signi…cant ant the 10 percent level in Model IX. The three macroeconomic variables, GDP, current account and budget de…cit one year prior to the crises are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero accross di¤erent model speci…cations.
We see in Table XI that More interestingly, we …nd that the average debt-to-equity ratio for …rms with a negative exposure to exchange rate movements (variable
) helps explain the amount of currency depreciation, even after controlling for country speci…c institutional variables. The coe¢cient is -1.6 on average (signi…cant in the three speci…cations), meaning that currency depreciations were larger in countries where negativelyexposed …rms were more levered. Additionally, this is the only measure of leverage that is signi…cant: the coe¢cient of the debt-to-equity ratio for …rms with positive ERB is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. When we use the weighted average debt-to-equity ratio (variable d ³ D E´) , the leverage measure is not signi…cant.
B Firm leverage and currency exposure
We complete the cross-sectional analysis by testing whether …rms' currency exposure measured by their exchange-rate betas a¤ects …rms' …nancing policies prior to a currency depreciation. If …nancial distress is likely to induce a government to let the currency depreciate as a way of bailing out companies, then we should expect …rms that bene…t the most from a currency depreciation to have a higher leverage than companies that su¤er from depreciation prior to a currency crisis.
We test this extreme by performing a regression analysis at the …rm level where the explanatory variable is the …rm's debt-to-equity ratio (book values) as of December prior to the corresponding currency crisis. The set of explanatory variables includes the …rm's exchange rate beta, calculated over a window of t = ¡60 to t = ¡24 months relative to the event month. We also use as explanatory variables the measures of corporate law from La Porta et al. (1998) described in the previous subsection. Ra jan and Zingales (1995) argue that highly levered companies are more likely to give up pro…table investment opportunities.
Hence, growth opportunities (proxied by the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets) should be negatively related to debt-to-equity ratios. We calculate the average market to book ratio in the three years preceding the currency crises for the 4,245 …rms in our sample.
In Rajan and Zingales (1995), size is measured by the logarithm of sales. They obtain a positive coe¢cient in their regressions, although, in their view, a negative relationship between size and debt levels is sensible if size is also a proxy for the information outside investors have. Our measure of size is a threeyear average of a …rm's sales in the three years before the relevant currency depreciation. Additionally, and despite disagreeing theoretical predictions regarding the e¤ect of pro…tability on leverage, they …nd a negative relationship between EBITDA (normalized by the book value of assets) and book debt-to-equity ratios. Our measure of pro…tability is EBIT normalized by total assets. We further control for the log of the GDP per capita in dollars.
[Insert Table XII]
The results from the regression are reported in Table XII . For the total sample (2,029 …rms with data available), we …nd results consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1995), since pro…tability and size have respectively negative and positive (and signi…cant at the 1 percent level) coe¢cients. Firms with growth opportunities do not display higher levels of debt (Rajan and Zingales also …nd that the coe¢cient of the market-to-book ratio is not signi…cant for Italy and Japan).
The negative and signi…cant coe¢cients for the variables 'Rule of Law', and 'E¢ciency of the Judicial System' con…rm the hypothesis in Bris and Koskinen (2000) that countries with low levels of legal protection should display higher debt levels. We also …nd, consistent with the results in Tables IV and V, that Asian …rms display, prior to the crises, relatively higher levels of debt than those in European and Latin American …rms.
Finally, and focusing on the coe¢cient for the exchange rate beta, we consistently …nd a negative relationship between a …rm's exposure to exchange rate movements and book leverage. Cross-sectionally, we should expect a contemporaneous positive relationship between leverage and currency exposure. If a proportion of a …rm's debt is denominated in a foreign currency, exchange rate depreciation a¤ects negatively the …rm's …nancial performance and hence should increase the …rm's leverage. Our results show exactly the opposite result, where the exchange-rate betas has been estimated without taking into account the e¤ects of the …rm's current leverage.
VII Conclusion
There is a prominent line of research (see Krugman (1999) and Bachetta et al (2000)) that argues that currency depreciations increase and even cause …nancial distress problems in private corporations and hence deepen a …nancial crisis in an economy. However, this kind of reasoning can only be true for those This paper uses company level data from eighteen countries that have su¤ered a currency crisis during the past decade. Companies are sorted into two groups depending on whether they bene…t from or are harmed by currency appreciations. The sorting is done using companies individual stock returns that are regressed on their home currency's movement against the U.S. dollar and on the part of market return that is orthogonal to the currency movement. Using this grouping we are able to show that companies that bene…t from currency depreciations have increasing leverage and declining pro…tability prior to a crisis.
Moreover, controlling for …rm characteristics, the …rms that bene…t from currency depreciations also have higher leverage prior to a crisis than …rms that are harmed by currency depreciations. Finally, the amount of currency depreciation is positively related to leverage in companies that bene…t from depreciations.
We uncover a motivation for currency crises not explored previously and whose implications are supported by the data. Firms take excessive risks with borrowed money in expectation of a bailout through a currency depreciation, if risks materialize. Of course this perverse e¤ect of …xed-exchange rate regimes can be avoided by means of a currency board, a common currency like the euro, or with a system of ‡oating rates.
Whether the corporate sector's choice between foreign and domestic debt a¤ects the probability and the severity of currency crises is still an open question. The measure of leverage that are reported in this paper does not distinguish among di¤erent sources of debt …nancing. Neither does this paper consider the di¤erence between debt issues and stock repurchases; both increase the debt-to-equity ratio. Disaggregated data on debt …nancing for emerging and developing economies such as the ones that we consider are not easily available, so indirect measures are necessary. The analysis, however, would have interesting implications, and deserves further research. 
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Fixed against the dollar six months before the crisis.
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The exchange rate is maintained within margins of ±7.5 percent. R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate This table displays the median Debt to Equity Ratio for a sample of firms in countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. 'Europe' includes firms from Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 'Asia' includes firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. 'Latin America' includes firms from Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. The ratio equals Total Debt to Shareholders Equity (book values). Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate beta, which is calculated as follows: for every country in our sample, we estimate the regression
, where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate This table displays the ratio of Short-Term Debt to Total Debt for a sample of firms in countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. 'Europe' includes firms from Finland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 'Asia' includes firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. 'Latin America' includes firms from Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. The ratio equals Total Debt to Shareholders Equity (book values). Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate beta, which is calculated as follows: for every country in our sample, we estimate the regression
, where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate 
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, where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate , where mt R is the corresponding market return, and st R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate This table reports the results of the regression of a firm's debt-to-equity ratio on the variables listed under the variables column for countries that have suffered a currency crises in the period 1985-2000. Europe' includes firms from Finland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 'Asia' includes firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. 'Latin America' includes firms from Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela. Firms are divided into two groups base on their exchange rate beta, which is calculated as follows: for every country in our sample, we estimate the regression R is the change in the exchange rate for the same period. We estimate the γ coefficients using monthly data from month t = -72 to month t = -37 relative to the currency depreciation month. Next, we estimate Datastream. The variables "Log GDP per capita", "Rule of Law", "Corruption", and "Efficiency of the Judicial System" are from La Porta et al. (1998) . P-values have been corrected for heteroskedasticity following the approach in White (1980). All R-squares are adjusted. Model III is estimated with country-fixed effects. The coefficient for the exchange rate beta variable has been multiplied by 6 10 . 
